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Abstract
Bayesian inference is limited in scope because it cannot be applied in ide-
alized contexts where none of the hypotheses under consideration is true and
because it is committed to always using the likelihood as a measure of eviden-
tial favoring, even when that is inappropriate. The purpose of this paper is
to study inductive inference in a very general setting where finding the truth
is not necessarily the goal and where the measure of evidential favoring is not
necessarily the likelihood. I use an accuracy argument to argue for probabil-
ism and I develop a new kind of argument to argue for two general updating
rules, both of which are reasonable in different contexts. One of the updating
rules has standard Bayesian updating, Bissiri et al.’s (2016) general Bayesian
updating, Douven’s (2016) IBE-based updating, and Vassend’s (2019a) quasi-
Bayesian updating as special cases. The other updating rule is novel.
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1 Introduction
Bayesians hold that inductive inference requires two ingredients. First, a prior prob-
ability function defined on the hypotheses under consideration. Second, a likelihood
function, which assigns a probability to the evidence conditional on each hypothesis.
Intuitively, the prior probability assigned to a hypotheses represents how plausible it
is that the hypothesis is true before the evidence has been taken into account. The
likelihood, on the other hand, is a measure of evidential favoring: if H1’s likelihood
on the evidence is greater than H2’s likelihood on the same evidence, then the evi-
dence favors H1 over H2. Given a prior and likelihood, Bayesians hold that the prior
probability of each hypothesis should be updated to a posterior probability through
the use of Bayes’s formula, so that the posterior probability of H is proportional to
the prior probability of H multiplied by its likelihood.
Bayesianism has become the most common formal framework used by philoso-
phers of science to study scientific methodology, and it is also an influential frame-
work for statistical inference. But it rests on an assumption that is often violated in
scientific practice, namely that one of the hypotheses under consideration is true.1
Suppose none of the hypotheses under consideration is true, so that the goal is in-
stead to find the hypothesis that is – in some sense – best. Depending on what is
meant by “best,” the likelihood may not be an appropriate measure of evidential
favoring. For example, suppose the goal is to identify the hypothesis whose expected
1This limitation is well known, but often ignored. For discussion of the problem, see, e.g. Box
(1980); Bernardo and Smith (1994); Forster and Sober (1994); Forster (1995); Key et al. (1999);
Shaffer (2001); Sprenger (2009); Gelman and Shalizi (2013); Vassend (2019b); Walker (2013); and
Sprenger (forthcoming).
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maximal prediction error on future data is as low as possible. Then, as Vassend
(2019a) shows, the likelihood is not an appropriate measure of evidential favoring
because the hypothesis that has the best likelihood score on the evidence will in gen-
eral not be the hypothesis that has the lowest expected maximal prediction error on
future data. In this context, a more reasonable measure of evidential favoring may
be one according to which the evidence favors H1 over H2 if and only if H1’s maximal
prediction error on the evidence is lower than H2’s maximal prediction error on the
evidence. The fact that Bayesianism is tied to using the likelihood as a measure of
evidential favoring is therefore a limitation of the framework.
The goal of this paper is to study inductive inference in a very general setting.
Suppose our goal is to identify the best hypothesis H (where “best” does not nec-
essarily mean “true”). Let p be a function that assigns a number between 0 and 1
(inclusive) to each hypothesis, such that p(H) is interpreted as representing a prior
judgment of how plausible it is that H is best (in the relevant sense) out of the
hypotheses under consideration. In the rest of the paper, I will refer to any such
function as a “credibility function”. Suppose, moreover, that Ev[E|H ] is an evi-
dential measure that is sensible given the purpose at hand. Then the questions to
consider are as follows: (1) What norms should p obey? (2) How should p(H) and
Ev[E|H ] be combined in order to produce a posterior score pE(H) that represents
how plausible it is that H is best in light of E and the prior information?
As we will see, one of the standard Bayesian arguments for probabilism general-
izes, so that – given widely applicable conditions – p and pE ought to be probability
functions. The more interesting results concern updating. I will show that, de-
pending on what the goal is, the prior probability function and evidential measure
should be combined in one of the following two ways in order to produce a posterior
probability:
Inferential updating. Given evidential measure Ev and prior proba-
bility function p, update p to the posterior pE by way of the following
formula:
pE(H) =
Ev[E|H ]p(H)∑
i Ev[E|Hi]p(Hi)
Predictive updating. Given evidential measure Ev and prior proba-
bility function p, update p to the posterior pE by way of the following
procedure:
Step 1. For each i, calculate q(Hi) = p(Hi) + Ev[E|Hi].
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Step 2. Transform q to pE as follows: for each i, pE(Hi) = 0
or pE(Hi) = q(Hi)+d, where d is the unique number such that
d is minimal and, for all i, pE(Hi) ≥ 0 and
∑
i pE(Hi) = 1.
The justification for the names of the two updating procedures will become clearer
later. Inferential updating is clearly a generalization of Bayesian updating. Indeed
Bayesian updating is just inferential updating with the likelihood used as the measure
of evidential favoring.2 What separates inferential updating from predictive updating
is the former rule’s commitment to Regularity : inferential updating will never assign
a probability of 0 to any hypothesis, whereas predictive updating typically will. In
Section 4, we’ll see that a commitment to Regularity is sometimes reasonable and
sometimes not.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I sketch an argument
for why any credibility function ought to be probabilistic, regardless of whether the
goal is truth or something else. Since the argument is a straightforward adaptation
of Pettigrew’s (2016) accuracy argument for probabilism, the section is brief. In
Section 3, I give characterizations of inferential and predictive updating from a set
of plausible assumptions. The strategy is to divide inductive updating into two
steps: in the first step, the prior plausibility of a hypothesis is combined with the
hypothesis’s score on the evidence according to some measure of evidential favoring
in order to produce a posterior score. In the second step, the posterior scores are
normalized so that they are probabilistic. As we’ll see, the requirement that the
combination step and normalization step commute in certain desirable ways, together
with a few other plausible assumptions, result in the conclusion that the combination
step and normalization step must both be either multiplicative or additive. The
characterizations of inferential and predictive updating are then just a few short
steps away. I end the paper with a discussion of inferential and predictive updating,
including their relationship to each other and to other updating rules.
2Predictive updating, on the other hand, may remind the reader of the alternative to Jeffrey
conditionalization derived by Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010). The two rules do indeed share sev-
eral features in common, although they are also importantly different. In fact, it is possible to
derive a special case of predictive updating by using a proof strategy that resembles the one in
Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010).
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2 Why credibility functions should be probabilis-
tic
Before we can show that credibility functions ought to be probabilistic, we need to
get clearer on what this claim amounts to. Let H be a set of hypotheses and suppose
the goal is to identify the hypothesis in H that is best rather than true (where
“best” can mean anything we like). One complication that arises when “true” is
replaced by “best” is that whereas there is only one true hypotheses, there may be
several that are best.3 For example, if “best” means “having a minimal maximum
expected prediction error,” then there may be several hypotheses that are tied for
best. Note, however, that this is more a theoretical possibility than a practical
one, since it is quite unlikely that multiple hypotheses would have (say) exactly the
same predictive accuracy score, especially if the number of hypotheses is large. I
will henceforth assume that at most one hypothesis out of the hypotheses under
consideration is best. Note that if we make this assumption, then the hypotheses
will also be mutually exclusive in the sense that in any subset of hypotheses at most
one hypothesis can be best.
Another theoretical possibility is that none of the hypotheses under consideration
is best. This can, for example, happen if the hypothesis space is infinite and does
not contain a single best hypothesis, but rather an infinite sequence of hypotheses
in ascending order of goodness.4 To preclude this possibility, we must also assume
that at least one of the hypotheses under consideration is best.
Provided we make the above assumptions (i.e. that exactly one of the hypotheses
inH is best), then there is nothing mathematically or philosophically that prevents us
from treating H as a sample space. I.e. H consists of hypotheses that are exhaustive
in the sense that one of the hypotheses is best and mutually exclusive in the sense
that at most one of the hypotheses is best in any collection of hypotheses. Note also
that there is a natural σ-algebra on H. More precisely, union (or disjunction) and
intersection (or conjunction) are defined in the normal way, the identity element for
conjunction (i.e. the top element of the algebra) isH, and the complement (negation)
of any set A formed through unions and intersections of subsets of H is defined in
the following way: ¬A := H − A. The main difference from the definition given
in most philosophical treatments of Bayesianism is that the top element is now H
rather than the tautology. This makes a big interpretive difference, but no difference
to the mathematics.
3I thank X for pointing this out to me.
4I thank a referee for pointing out this possibility.
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Given the above set-up, we can now define what it means for a function on the
algebra, H∗, generated by H to be probabilistic in the following way:
Probability axioms. A function p defined on H∗ is probabilistic if and
only if it satisfies the following requirements:
1. p(H) = 1.
2. p(A) ≥ 0 for all subsets A of H∗.
3. p(A∨B) = p(A) + p(B)− p(A&B), for all subsets A and B
of H∗.
Note that credibility functions automatically satisfy 2 since we have defined them
to have a range between 0 and 1, so the real question is whether they ought to satisfy
1 and 3. One of the standard arguments for why regular credence functions (or
degrees of belief) ought to be probabilistic is the accuracy argument (Joyce (1998),
Joyce (2009), Pettigrew (2016), Predd et al. (2009)). Briefly, the argument is as
follows:5 the ideal credence function to have is the function that assigns 1 to the
hypothesis that is true and 0 to all hypotheses that are false. Suppose now that we
have a divergence measure (satisfying certain reasonable properties) that quantifies
the distance between the ideal function and any other candidate credence function.
It can then be shown that any credence function that is not probabilistic will be
dominated by some probabilistic function in the sense that the probabilistic function
will be guaranteed to have a smaller divergence from the ideal function. Since it is
irrational to choose an option that is known to be dominated, it follows that it is
irrational to use a non-probabilistic credence function.
An interesting fact about the accuracy argument for probabilism is that it does
not depend for its validity on any specific interpretation of the credence function, nor
does it depend on the assumption that the ideal credibility function is the function
that assigns 1 to the hypothesis that is true and 0 to all hypotheses that are false.
Indeed, nothing in the accuracy argument prevents us from designating the ideal
credibility function otherwise. Hence, we can easily adapt the argument to a context
where the goal is to identify the hypothesis that is best rather than true. In such a
context, the ideal function would clearly be one that assigns 1 to the hypothesis that
is best and 0 to all other hypotheses. We can then formulate the following version
of the accuracy argument:
5There are several versions of the argument; here, I present a variant of Pettigrew’s (2016)
version.
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P1: The ideal credibility function is the function that assigns 1 to the
hypothesis that is best and 0 to all other hypotheses.
P2: Given any non-probabilistic function, there is a probabilistic function
that is guaranteed to have a smaller divergence from the ideal function
(given that the divergence measure has certain reasonable properties).
P3: Given any probabilistic function, there does not exist any function
that is guaranteed to have a smaller divergence from the ideal function
(given that the divergence measure has certain reasonable properties).
P4: If P1-P3, then non-probabilistic credibility functions are irrational.
C: Non-probabilistic credibility functions are irrational.
P2 and P3 are mathematical theorems (proven by Predd et al. (2009)) that hold
regardless of what we choose as the ideal function. P1 and P4, on the other hand,
are intuitively reasonable general rational principles. The main question that may
be raised about the generalized version of the accuracy argument is whether the
conditions on the divergence measure are still reasonable when truth is no longer the
goal. For example, P2 and P3 require the assumption that the divergence measure
belong to the class of Bregman divergences. Is this a reasonable requirement to
make? My only response to this question is that I do not see how this assumption
(and other necessary mathematical assumptions) are more plausible if truth is the
goal than if the goal is to identify the hypothesis that is best in some other sense. So,
at least in my eyes, the generalized accuracy argument is at least as plausible as the
original argument. In any case, my main goal in this paper is not to give a careful
analysis of the accuracy argument. From now I will assume that any credibility
function ought to be probabilistic. That is, I will assume that if p is a function
that assigns a number between 0 and 1 to each hypothesis H that represents how
plausible it is that H is best (in some sense), then p ought to be probabilistic. In the
next section, I turn to the main question of the paper: given a probability function
p and given a piece of evidence E, how should p be updated in light of E?
3 Deriving the updating rules
Suppose we have a credibility function defined on a hypothesis set H that is proba-
bilistic in the sense of the preceding section. Suppose, also, that we have an evidential
measure function Ev[E|H ] defined on the set of evidence and the set of hypotheses
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under consideration. Note that we are not assuming that Ev[E|H ] is probabilistic
(e.g.
∑
i Ev[E|Hi] need not sum to 1). It is widely accepted that if the goal is
to find the true hypothesis in a partition of hypotheses and the evidential measure
is the likelihood, i.e. Ev[E|H ] = p(E|H), then any probability function over the
hypotheses ought to be updated through Bayesian updating:
Bayesian updating: pE(H) =
p(E|H)p(H)∑
i
p(E|Hi)p(Hi)
The natural generalization of Bayesian updating is what I have called inferential
updating in the introduction. However, it is not clear why the prior probability
function and the evidential measure should always be combined in a Bayesian-like
manner, regardless of what the evidential measure is and regardless of what the pur-
pose of updating is. Unfortunately, whereas the accuracy argument for probabilism
does not make any assumptions about how the credibility function is interpreted,
the standard accuracy argument for Bayesian updating (Greaves and Wallace, 2006)
relies on properties that are unique to the likelihood, in particular the fact that the
likelihood forms a joint distribution with the prior. Thus, the standard accuracy
argument does not generalize to cases where the evidential measure is not the like-
lihood. Other standard arguments for Bayesian updating have the same limitation
(e.g. Dutch book arguments). A different kind of approach is therefore needed.
Bissiri et al. (2016) come up with a different approach. They show that provided
that the evidential measure is a function of an additive loss function, L(E,H), such
that Ev[E1&E2|H ] = f(L(E1, H) + L(E2, H)), and given that a few other assump-
tions are met, then the updating procedure must have the following form, where c is
some constant:
pE(H) =
e−c∗L(E|H)p(H)∑
i e
−c∗L(E|Hi)p(Hi)
(3.1)
Bissiri et al. (2016) call the above updating procedure “general Bayesian updat-
ing.” General Bayesian updating traces back to Zhang (2006) and been increasingly
influential in statistics in recent years.6 Although Bissiri et al.’s (2016) argument
for general Bayesian updating is interesting, it has several limitations. One problem
is that, as Vassend (2019b) argues, the probabilities in (3.1) cannot be interpreted
in the standard Bayesian way as plausibilities of truth. But if the probabilities are
not standard credibility functions, then the decision theoretic framework assumed
by Bissiri et al. (2016) would seem to lack justification. The argument also makes
6See Gru¨nwald and van Ommen (2017) for a thorough discussion of general Bayesian updating
and related updating rules.
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certain mathematical assumptions that seem hard to justify from a philosophical
point of view. In particular, the authors base their argument in part on the use of
statistical divergence measures, and they assume that the divergence belongs to the
class of f -diverences.7 This assumption rules out many standard divergence mea-
sures, including all Bregman divergences aside from the Kullback-Leibler divergence
(Amari, 2009).8 A final limitation of Bissiri et al.’s (2016) derivation is that there
are many reasonable evidential measures that cannot be written as a function of an
additive loss function. Indeed, even the likelihood will only have such a form if the
evidence is independent conditional on Hi, for all i.
9 Thus, although their argument
is interesting, a more general approach that makes less restrictive and more philo-
sophically defensible assumptions is desirable. That is the goal of this section. Later
we will see that Bissiri et al.’s (2016) updating rule may be derived as a special case.
To start, note that ordinary Bayesian updating can be decomposed into two steps:
Combination step. For each i, calculate p∗(Hi) = p(E|Hi)p(Hi).
Normalization step. Transform p∗ to p′ as follows: for each i, p′(Hi) =
p∗(Hi)
p(E)
.
In the first step, the prior plausibility of the hypothesis is combined with the
evidential score (i.e. likelihood) of the hypothesis in order to produce an overall
judgment of the hypothesis’s posterior plausibility. In the second step, the posterior
plausibility of all the hypotheses are rescaled in such a way that they jointly obey
the probability axioms, i.e. such that all the posterior plausibility scores fall between
0 and 1, inclusive, and jointly sum to 1.
Bayesian updating is a special case of a much broader class of updating rules that
decompose into a combination step and a normalization step. The purpose of the re-
mainder of this paper will be to study this class of updating rules. The combination
step requires a combination function, c, that takes as its input a prior probability,
p(H) and a set of evidential scores, Ev[E1|H ], Ev[E2|H,E1], Ev[E3|H,E1, E2], etc.,
and that assigns a total score to H , taking into consideration both its prior proba-
bility and its performance on the evidence. The normalization step then transforms
7They also give an alternative derivation that does not make this assumption. However, the
alternative derivation makes other suspect assumptions. In particular, it assumes that the normal-
ization procedure is multiplicative, which we’ll see later in this paper can be put into question.
8Recall that Bregman divergences play a crucial role in the accuracy argument for probabilism.
The justification for the focus on Bregman divergences is their tight connection to strict propriety
(see Predd et al. (2009)).
9If p(E1, E2|H) = p(E1|H)p(E2|H), we can write p(E1, E2|H) = e
log p(E1|H)+log p(E2|H), i.e. the
likelihood is of the form required by Bissiri et al. (2016). But if p(E1, E2|H) 6= p(E1|H)p(E2|H),
then we cannot write the likelihood in this way.
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those scores into probabilities. In other words, on an abstract level, our purpose will
be to study updating procedures that decompose in the following way:
Combination step: For each hypothesis, Hi, a set of evidential scores
and a prior probability are combined using some combination function c
in order to produce an overall posterior score for Hi.
Normalization step: The posterior scores of all the Hi are transformed
using some function N such that they jointly satisfy the probability ax-
ioms.
In the next two subsections the combination step and the normalization step are
analyzed in detail. The goal is to show that – given reasonable assumptions – the
combination function c and the normalization function N both have a very limited
set of possible functional forms.
3.1 The combination step
Let e1 and e2 represent the evidential scores of a hypothesis H on some evidence,
and let h represent H ’s prior probability; then there are two candidate forms for the
combination function that arguably stand out as being particularly plausible:
Additive combination: c(e1, e2, h) = e1 + e2 + h
Multiplicative combination: c(e1, e2, h) = e1 ∗ e2 ∗ h
Note that e1 and e2 here may represent either conditional or unconditional ev-
idential scores. For example, e1 may represent Ev[E1|H ], i.e. the unconditional
evidential score of H on E1, or it may represent Ev[E1|H,E2], i.e. the conditional
evidential score of H on E1 given that E2 has already been taken into account. Note,
also, that to say that the combination function is additive or multiplicative is not the
same as saying that the evidential measure is additive or multiplicative in the sense
that Ev[E1, E2|H ] = Ev[E1|H ] + Ev[E2|H ] or Ev[E1, E2|H ] = Ev[E1|H ] ∗ Ev[E2|H ].
The latter assumptions are much stronger, and amount to assuming that E1 and E2
are independent conditional on H (relative to the evidential measure Ev).
If we make a few reasonable assumptions, we can prove that the combination
function must be multiplicative or additive. First of all, suppose we have evidential
scores e1 and e2, and a prior probability h. Clearly, the order in which we combine
the evidential scores and the prior should not matter for the final result we get.
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That is not to say that the order in which the evidence is received does not matter;
it may. For example, if we flip a coin and the outcomes are six heads in a row
and then six tails in a row, then the order of the outcomes strongly suggest that
the outcomes are probabilistically dependent. Nevertheless, the order in which we
evaluate the available pieces of evidence in order to produce an overall judgment
should not influence the overall judgment at which we arrive. For that reason, the
combination function should be commutative: c(e1, e2) = c(e2, e1). Furthermore, it
clearly should not matter whether we first combine e1 and e2 and then combine the
result of that with e3, or whether we combine e2 with e3 and then combine the result
with e1, or whether we combine all three pieces of evidence at the same time. In
other words, c should be associative: c(e1, c(e2, e3)) = c(c(e1, e2), e3) = c(e1, e2, e3).
The final reasonable requirement is more quantitative. Clearly, the impact that
e1 has on H ’s overall evidential score, after e2 has already been taken into account,
should not depend on the impact that e2 has on H . That is not to say that a piece
of evidence E2 should not influence the impact that a different piece of evidence
E1 has on H ’s evidential score; it may well, but if it does it should do so through
Ev[E1|H,E2]. A piece of evidence may influence the evidential impact conferred by
another piece of evidence, but the evidential scores themselves should not influence
each other. In other words, the requirement is that the impact that, for example,
e1 = Ev[E1|H,E2] makes on H ’s total evidential score should not depend on the
impact that e2 = Ev[E2|H ] makes on H ’s total evidential score, nor vice versa.
Given that we are willing to suppose that the combination function is twice
differentiable, the preceding requirement may be naturally formalized as constraints
on the partial derivatives of the combination function. Let c(x, y) be the combination
function as a function of variables x and y. Then the impact that the evidential score
e1 makes on H ’s total evidential score is plausibly the value of the partial derivative
of c(x, y) with respect to x, when evaluated at x = e1. If
∂c(x,y)
∂x
c(x = e1, y) is a
large number, then that means setting x to e1 makes a large difference to H ’s overall
evidential score; if it is 0, then e1 makes no difference.
The requirement that the impact that e1 makes should not depend on the impact
that e2 makes, nor vice versa, for any e1 and e2, may then be formalized in terms of a
constraint on the higher-order partial derivatives of c, namely that for some constant
k the following equation be obeyed:
∂2c(x, y)
∂x∂y
= k
The above equation formalizes the idea that the impact that x makes, i.e. ∂c
∂x
,
should not depend on the impact that y makes, i.e. ∂c
∂y
, where x and y represent
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any possible evidential scores. We can now show the following (the derivation is in
Appendix A):
Characterization of the combination function. Suppose the combi-
nation function, c(x, y) satisfies the following requirements :
1. c is commutative.
2. c is associative.
3. c is twice differentiable.
4. c’s partial derivatives satisfy the following equation, for some num-
ber k:
∂2c(x, y)
∂x∂y
= k
Then c must have one of the following two forms :
1. If k = 0, then c(x, y) = x+ y.
2. If k 6= 0, then c(x, y) = xy.
Hence, it follows that the combination function must be additive or multiplicative.
Of course, this conclusion is only as plausible as the assumptions from which it
is derived, and some people may be uncomfortable with some of the assumptions
that have been made, in particular the condition on the partial derivatives of the
combination function. As it happens, it’s possible to derive the conclusion from quite
different assumptions. Hence, in order to show the robustness of the conclusion, I
provide an alternative characterization of the combination function in Appendix F.
3.2 The normalization step
After the combination function has produced a posterior plausibility score, the pos-
terior score must be normalized to be a probability. In theory, normalizing a set of
numbers means transforming the numbers in such a way that they are all between 0
and 1 and jointly sum to 1, while at the same time retaining as much of their internal
structure as possible. In practice, this means that the most extreme numbers in the
set may be forced to take the value 0, while the remaining numbers in the set are
rescaled by some function, f . In other words, normalization in general takes the
following functional form:
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N(x) =
{
0 Given that x is sufficiently low
f(x) Otherwise
(3.2)
For example, in the normalization step of standard Bayesian updating, N(x) =
f(x) (i.e. no non-zero numbers are normalized to 0) and if the set to be normalized
is {a1, a2, . . . , an}, then f(x) =
1∑
i
ai
. Note that both N and f are relative to the set
that is being normalized; hence, if we need to be precise, we should write NS and fS,
where the subscript indicates the set that is being normalized. Nevertheless, I will
typically leave off the subscripts in order to avoid clutter.
Clearly, f should be a one-to-one function. Indeed, except in the case where x
and y are both normalized to 0, it should be the case that if x < y then f(x) < f(y).
Furthermore, it is clear that the function f ought to commute with the combination
function. Suppose we have scores e1, e2, and h. Then we should arrive at the
same posterior probability regardless of whether we do either of the following: first
we combine h and e2, normalize, then combine the normalized result with e1 and
normalize again; or we first combine h and e1, normalize, and then combine that
normalized result with e2 before normalizing again. In symbols, we require, for
all possible scores x, y, and z, that: f(c(x, f(c(y, z)))) = f(f(c(x, y), z)). The
justification for this requirement is, again, that the order in which we evaluate our
evidence – which is arbitrary – should not have an influence on our final judgment.
By combining just the preceding two requirements, we can show the following:
Characterization of the normalization procedure. Suppose we have
a normalization procedure as in (3.2) that satisfies the following require-
ments :
1. f commutes with the combination function c. For all x, y, and x:
f(c(x, f(c(y, z)))) = f(f(c(x, y), z)).
2. f is one-to-one: for all x and y, f(x) = f(y) if and only if x = y.
Then the normalization process must have one of the following forms, for
some constant k that depends on the set, S, of numbers being normalized :
1. If the combination function is multiplicative, then, for all x in S,
f(x) = k ∗ x.
2. If the combination function is additive, then, for all x in S, f(x) =
x+ k.
The proof, which again is straightforward, is in Appendix B.
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3.3 Characterizations of inferential and predictive updating
The results so far show that any updating procedure needs to have either: (1) A
multiplicative combination step and a multiplicative normalization step, or (2) an
additive combination step and an additive normalization step. Call an updating
procedure that satisfies either (1) or (2) a legitimate updating procedure.10
To characterize inferential updating we now introduce the following principle:
Regularity: No hypothesis is ever conclusively ruled out by any evidence
unless the evidence logically refutes the hypothesis, i.e. the posterior
probability of any hypothesis is always greater than 0.
We can then show the following (see Appendix C):
Characterization of inferential updating. The only legitimate up-
dating procedure that satisfies Regularity is inferential updating. I.e.,
given evidential measure Ev and prior probability function p, update p
to the posterior pE by way of the following formula:
pE(H) =
Ev[E|H ]p(H)∑
i Ev[E|Hi]p(Hi)
Inferential updating satisfies Regularity; it will never result in any hypothesis
having a posterior probability of 0. On the other hand, in Appendix C, I show that
an updating procedure that uses an additive combination function and an additive
normalization function must violate Regularity; most of the time, any such updating
rule must assign a posterior probability of 0 to some hypotheses. But this does
not mean that such an updating rule should never be used. As we will see in the
next section, sometimes we may want to be able to exclude certain hypotheses from
consideration—i.e., assign them a posterior probability of 0.
Nevertheless, we do not want to exclude more hypotheses than is warranted by
the data. The updating procedure ought to be conservative and exclude as few
hypotheses as possible at every step. In other words, any updating procedure that
violates Regularity should plausibly still satisfy the following principle:
10Note that not every updating rule that has been suggested in the literature is legitimate in
this sense of the word. For example, Douven and Wenmackers (2017) consider a rule according to
which pE(H) = c∗ (p(H)∗p(E|H)+ f(E,H)) where c is a normalization constant and f(E,H) is a
“bonus” assigned to H in case H is the best explanation of E. This updating rule is not legitimate
because it is neither purely additive nor purely multiplicative. On the other hand, the class of rules
considered in Douven (2016) are legitimate.
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Conservativeness: The updating procedure assigns a posterior proba-
bility of 0 to as few hypotheses as possible, given the combination func-
tion, the normalization procedure, and the evidence available.
We are now in a position to characterize predictive updating:
Characterization of predictive updating. The only legitimate up-
dating procedure that violates Regularity, but satisfies Conservativeness,
is predictive updating. I.e., given evidential measure Ev and prior prob-
ability function p, update p to the posterior pE by way of the following
procedure:
Step 1. For each i, calculate q(Hi) = p(Hi) + Ev[E|Hi].
Step 2. Transform q to pE as follows: for each i, pE(Hi) = 0
or pE(Hi) = q(Hi)+d, where d is the unique number such that
d is minimal and, for all i, pE(Hi) ≥ 0 and
∑
i pE(Hi) = 1.
4 Discussion of inferential and predictive updat-
ing
4.1 The difference between inferential updating and predic-
tive updating
Inferential updating and predictive updating differ in that the former updating rule
obeys Regularity while the latter rule does not. Is Regularity a reasonable constraint?
In some contexts it is, but in others it is not. Suppose our main priority is to identify
the hypothesis that is true or (if none of the hypotheses is true) the hypothesis that is
closest to the truth according to some appropriate measure of closeness to the truth.
Given this goal, it is reasonable to be risk-averse and open-minded: we do not want
to rule out any hypothesis as potentially being the hypothesis that is true. Even
if a lot of evidence strongly suggests that a hypothesis is false, there is always the
possibility that the evidence is unrepresentative or misleading. And so Regularity is
a reasonable constraint in this context.
However, suppose we do not care about which of our hypotheses is true or closest
to the truth; our goal is not inferential, but predictive. We wish to find, as efficiently
as possible, the subset of hypotheses that can be expected to be as predictively
accurate as possible. In this context, there is no theoretical justification for requiring
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that the updating rule obey Regularity; on the contrary, there are good reasons for
why we might want an updating rule that violates Regularity. In particular, suppose
the posterior distribution will be used in order to make a weighted probabilistic
prediction, i.e. the goal is for p(D|Hi)pE(Hi) to be as accurate on future data D
as possible. In that case, it would seem inadvisable to assign positive probability
to any hypothesis that has shown itself to be very predictively inaccurate, since the
predictions made by such a hypothesis would likely throw off the weighted prediction.
On the other hand, we do not want to go to the opposite extreme and base the
prediction on the single hypothesis that has performed best on the evidence, as that
is liable to lead to overfitting (Forster and Sober, 1994). Predictive updating enables
one to set the probabilities of predictively inaccurate hypotheses to 0 in a principled
(and conservative) way.
Let’s consider a specific example. When the hypotheses under considerations
make probabilistic predictions and the goal is maximal predictive accuracy, it is
natural to use a strictly proper scoring rule as the measure of evidential favoring
(Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). For various reasons, the most popular scoring rule
in applied research is probably the Continuous Ranked Probability Score (CRPS).
Suppose we have a set of competing statistical models M1, M2, etc., and for each
model, let pMi be the marginal (cumulative) probability forecast distribution corre-
sponding to Mi. Suppose, moreover, that pMi has finite first moment, that X , X1
and X2 are independent and identically distributed random variables that follow the
distribution of pMi , and that x is the actual observed outcome. Then the CRPS can
be written in the following way (where the expectations are taken relative to pMi):
CRPS(pMi , x) = E|X − x| −
1
2
E|X1 −X2| (4.1)
As (4.1) makes clear, CRPS is a statistical generalization of absolute error. As
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) point out, a significant benefit of the CRPS is that it is
easily interpretable, since the outputs of (4.1) can be reported in the same units as
the measurements. For example, suppose the measurements are in terms of meters.
Then the CRPS score of a model on an observation will be a representation of how
many meters inaccurate the model’s predictions are of that observation, on average
(since the prediction is a probability distribution rather than a single number, the
average is needed).
If we let Ev[x|pMi] = a ∗ CRPS(pMi, x), where a is some constant, and assign
prior probabilities to all the models, then predictive updating can be used to assign
posterior probabilities to all the models.11 Importantly, given sufficient evidence
11If the models contain parameters, then the probability distributions over those parameters may
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(and depending on how the constant a is chosen) many of the models will receive a
posterior probability of 0. These posterior probabilities can then be used for model
selection or for making a weighted prediction using all the models. Of course, it is
an empirical question whether predictive updating is better (for predictive purposes)
than inferential updating (including standard Bayesian updating). An empirical
evaluating of predictive updating will have to wait for a different occasion, however.
In this section I have simply tried to suggest one concrete way in which predictive
updating may be implemented.
4.2 The relationship between inferential updating and other
updating procedures
As was already mentioned in the introduction to the paper, standard Bayesian updat-
ing is clearly a special case of inferential updating: more precisely, we get Bayesian
updating if and only if Ev[E|H ] ∝ p(E|H), i.e. if and only if the evidential measure
is proportional to the likelihood. What Vassend (2019a) calls “quasi-Bayesian up-
dating” is also a special case of inferential updating; indeed, quasi-Baysian updating
is simply inferential updating with an evidential measure that has been suitably cal-
ibrated to a verisimilitude measure. Similarly, Douven’s (2016) IBE-based updating
rule is also clearly a kind of inferential updating.
Perhaps more interestingly, Bissiri et al.’s (2016) general Bayesian updating is
also a special case of inferential updating. More precisely, we have:
General Bayesian updating is a special case of inferential updat-
ing. Suppose the evidential measure Ev is a strictly decreasing function f
of some loss function, L(E,H), such that for all E1 and E2, Ev satisfies
the following conditions :
1. Ev[E1|H,E2] = Ev[E2|H ] = f(L(E1, H)).
2. Ev[E1, E2|H ] = f(L(E1, H) + L(E2, H)) .
Then inferential updating has the following form:
p(H|E) =
e−c∗L(E,H)p(H)∑
i e
−c∗L(E,Hi)p(Hi)
For some constant c.
be updated using either inferential or predictive updating.
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A sketch of the proof, which is straightforward, is given in Appendix E. Although
general Bayesian updating is a special case of inferential updating, the reverse is
not the case because – as was previously mentioned – many reasonable evidential
measures cannot be written as a function of an additive loss function. Suppose,
for example, that the hypotheses under consideration are real-valued functions, fi
and that the evidential measure is of the form Ev[(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn)|fi] =
Minimum(|y1 − fi(x1)|, |y1 − fi(x1)|, . . . , |y1 − fi(x1)|). It is clear in this case that
the evidential measure cannot be written as a function of an additive loss function,
simply because the Minimum operator is not additive.
A diagram depicting the relationship between inferential updating, predictive
updating, and various updating rules that have been suggested in the literature is
given in Figure 1.
Legitimate updating rules
Inferential updating
Quasi-Bayesian
(Vassend, 2019a)
Standard Bayesian IBE-based
(Douven, 2016)
General Bayesian
(Bissiri et al., 2016)
Predictive updating
Figure 1: Overview of various updating rules
5 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper has been to justify a set of very general synchronic
and diachronic inductive norms. The resulting normative framework can be put to
both philosophical and scientific use. In philosophy of science, a standard way of
analyzing scientific methodology is by seeing whether the methodology makes sense
from a Bayesian perspective. For example, in this way, Sober (2015) analyzes parsi-
mony inference,12 Dawid et al. (2015) analyze no-alternatives arguments in physics,
12Sober uses a likelihoodist approach, which is Bayesianism without the priors.
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Schupbach (2018) analyzes robustness analysis, and Myrvold (2016) evaluates the
epistemic value of unification. Since the preceding analyses take place in a Bayesian
framework, they inherit the limitations and assumptions of Bayesianism. In the
broader normative framework developed in this paper, it’s possible to check whether
the analyses still hold up when those assumptions are lifted. For example, Myrvold
(2016) shows that more unifying hypotheses will be more confirmed by evidence than
less unifying hypotheses, other things being equal. Since his analysis is Bayesian,
he implicitly uses the likelihood as his measure of evidential favoring. A natural
question to ask is whether his result still holds if the likelihood is replaced with
an arbitrary measure of evidential favoring. The perhaps surprising answer is yes,
although a proper demonstration of this fact must be reserved for a different time.
The normative framework developed in this paper can also be used for scien-
tific inference. Indeed, implicitly it already has been—as shown in Section 4.2, the
general Bayesian updating rule suggested by Bissiri et al. (2016) is a special case of
inferential updating, and general Bayesian updating is gaining in popularity in the
statistical community. But inferential updating is more general than general Bayesian
updating, and allows for the use of evidential measures that cannot be represented
in Bissiri et al.’s (2016) framework. One example is the phylogenetic parsimony
measure discussed by Vassend (2019a). Predictive updating can also be applied in
scientific inference problems, for example through the use of strictly proper scoring
rules as suggested in Section 4.1. Of course, it is ultimately an empirical question
whether predictive updating performs better than inferential updating. An answer
to this question must wait until later; in this paper, my goal has been to provide
a general normative framework for inductive inference that is as flexible as possible
while obeying basic theoretical desiderata.
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A Characterization of the combination function
The goal of this section is to show the characterization of the combination function
in Section 3.1. There are two cases to consider: k = 0 and k 6= 0. Since the two
cases are very similar, I will only consider the case where k 6= 0. So suppose that for
some non-zero k, we have:
∂2c(x, y)
∂x∂y
= k (A.1)
Taking the antiderivative with respect to x, it follows that:
∂c(x, y)
∂y
= kx+ C(y) +D (A.2)
Where C(y) is a function of y, but not x, and D is some real number. Taking
the antiderivative of (A.2) with respect to y, we get:
c(x, y) = kxy +
∫
C(y)dy +Dy +G(x) + F (A.3)
Where G is a function of x and F is some real number. Moreover, exchanging
the labels x and y in (A.3) gives us:
c(y, x) = kyx+
∫
C(x)dx+Dx+G(y) + F (A.4)
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But since c(x, y) = c(y, x), (A.3) and (A.4) must be equal, which means that
kxy +
∫
C(y)dy +Dy + G(x) + F = kxy +
∫
C(x)dx +Dx + G(y) + F , and hence∫
C(y)dy +Dy +G(x) =
∫
C(x)dx+Dx+G(y). Rearranging, we get:
G(x) =
∫
C(x)dx+Dx+G(y)−
∫
C(y)dy −Dy (A.5)
But since G(x) does not depend on y, the only way for (A.5) to be true is if
G(y)−
∫
C(y)dy−Dy is equal to some constant number, c. Hence,
∫
C(y)dy+Dy =
G(y)− c . Plugging this back into (A.3) (and absorbing the constant c into F ), we
get:
c(x, y) = kxy +G(x) +G(y) + F (A.6)
Without loss of generality, we may assume that G(0) = 0, because if G(0) = A
for some non-zero A, then we can just put G′(x) = G(x)−A and F ′ = F + 2A, and
we get: c(x, y) = kxy + G′(x) + G′(y) + F ′, with G′(0) = 0 (i.e. we simply absorb
the constant A into F ′).
Now the fact that c is associative and commutative means that c(c(x, y), z)) =
c(c(y, z), x), and hence (A.6) implies that, for all x, y, and z:
k(kxy +G(x) +G(y) + F )z +G(kxy +G(x) +G(y) + F ) +G(z) + F
= k(kyz +G(y) +G(z) + F )x+G(kyz +G(y) +G(z) + F ) +G(x) + F
(A.7)
Simplifying, we have:
[G(x) +G(y) + F ]kz +G[kxy +G(x) +G(y) + F ] +G(z)
= G(y)kx+G(z)kx+ Fkx+G[kyz +G(y) +G(z) + F ] +G(x)
(A.8)
Note that because c is twice differentiable, so is G. Taking the derivative of each
side of (A.8) with respect to z gives:
[G(x)+G(y)+F ]k+
∂G(z)
∂z
=
∂G(z)
∂z
kx+G′[kyz+G(y)+G(z)+F ]∗
∂G(z)
∂z
(A.9)
Next, taking the derivative of each side of (A.9) with respect to x gives:
∂G(x)
∂x
k =
∂G(z)
∂z
k (A.10)
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Hence, since k 6= 0, it follows that ∂G(x)
∂x
= ∂G(z)
∂z
. But since G(x) does not depend
on z and G(z) does not depend on x, this means that ∂G(x)
∂x
must be a constant
number, i.e. ∂G(x)
∂x
= a for some constant a. Since we are assuming that G(0) = 0, it
follows that G(x) = ax. Next, the fact that c(x, y, z) = c(c(x, y), z) implies:
kxyz+ax+ay+az+F = k(kxy+ax+ay+F )z+a(kxy+ax+ay+F )+az+F (A.11)
Comparing the terms that contain xyz,13 we see that k = 1, and hence:
ax+ ay = axz + ayz + Fz + axy + a2x+ a2y + Fa (A.12)
Comparing the terms that contain z, we see that a(x+ y) + F = 0 for all x and
y. The only way this can be true is if a = F = 0. Hence we have, finally, that
c(x, y) = xy.
B Characterization of the normalization step
The goal of this section is to show the characterization of the normalization step
in Section 3.2. Let {ai} be an arbitrary set of n numbers, S1, with normalization
function fS1. Consider the set S2 = {
1
ai
} and the set S3 = {1i}, which consists
of n copies of 1. Then condition (1) implies that, for all i, f(c(f(c( 1
ai
, ai)), 1)) =
f(c( 1
ai
, f(c(ai, 1)))), where the various f ’s are relative to the relevant sets. For exam-
ple, in f(c( 1
ai
, ai)), f is a rescaling function defined on the set {c(
1
ai
, ai)} . Note that
we are abusing notation here: strictly speaking the various f ’s are not the same func-
tion, since they are defined over different sets. However, to avoid needless clutter, I
use f without subscripts.
According to the characterization of the combination function, the combination
function is either multiplicative or additive. Since the derivations are very similar, I
will only show that the normalization function must be multiplicative given that the
combination function is multiplicative. So suppose that the combination function
is c(a, b) = ab. Then we get: f(f( 1
ai
∗ ai) ∗ 1) = f(
1
ai
∗ f(ai ∗ 1)). Thus, we have:
f(f(1)) = f( 1
ai
∗ f(ai)), i.e. f(
1
ai
∗ f(ai)) is a constant. But since, f is one-to-one,
that means 1
ai
∗ f(ai) must also be a constant. That is, there exists a constant k
such that, for all ai in S,
1
ai
∗ f(ai) = k. Hence f(ai) = k ∗ ai for all ai. Since S
13Which we can do, as before, by successively differentiating with respect to x, y, and z. This
proof method is sometimes called “equating coefficients” (Tanton, 2005, p. 169).
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was an arbitrary set, it follows that in general the normalization procedure must be
multiplicative given that the combination function is multiplicative.
C Characterization of inferential updating
The goal in this section is to show that the only legitimate updating rule that satisfies
Regularity is inferential updating. According to the results in sections 3.1 and 3.2,
any legitimate updating rule must either have (1) a multiplicative combination step
and a multiplicative normalization step, or (2) an additive combination step and an
additive normalization step. It is easy to show that it is possible for an updating rule
that satisfies (1) to satisfy Regularity, and that – indeed – the resulting updating
rule is inferential updating. In order to show that inferential updating is the only
updating rule that satisfies Regularity, it suffices to show that there is no updating
rule satisfying (2) that also satisfies Regularity.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some updating rule that
satisfies both (2) and Regularity. In order for Regularity to be obeyed, it has to be
the case that given any set of non-zero prior probabilities over a set of hypotheses,
h1, h2, . . . , hn, and given any set of evidential scores for the hypotheses, e1, e2, . . . , en,
the posteriors are also all non-zero. Thus, if N is the normalization function, then
the following must be true for all hi:
N(ei + hi) > 0 (C.1)
Since the normalization function is assumed to satisfy (2), C.1 implies that the
following is true for all i, where d is an additive normalization constant:
ei + hi + d > 0 (C.2)
Since the posterior probabilities must sum to 1, we also have:∑
i
(ei + hi + d) = 1 (C.3)
And therefore, d = − 1
n
∑
ei. And so we have, for all hi:
ei + hi −
1
n
∑
ei > 0 (C.4)
But it’s obvious that (D.4) will not in general be true. For example, suppose e1
is the smallest ei. Then r = ei −
1
n
∑
ei < 0. Now suppose it’s also the case that
h1 < −r. Then we have:
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e1 + h1 −
1
n
∑
ei = r + h1 < 0 (C.5)
Consequently, additive combination and additive normalization jointly violate
Regularity. So there can be no updating procedure that satisfies both (2) and Reg-
ularity.
D Characterization of predictive updating
The goal in this section is to show that the only legitimate updating rule that violates
Regularity but satisfies Conservativeness is predictive updating. It is clear that any
updating rule that satisfies Conservativeness but violates Regularity must be addi-
tive. This is because any multiplicative updating rule that satisfies Conservativeness
clearly also satisfies Regularity.
So suppose the updating rule is additive and satisfies Conservativeness. Then
the goal is to show that the updating rule must be equivalent to predictive updat-
ing. Since the rule is additive, it must have the following form, where pE is the
posterior probability distribution, Hi is a hypothesis, hi is the prior probability of
the hypothesis, ei is the evidential score of the hypothesis, and d is a normalization
constant:
pE(H) =
{
0 Given that x is sufficiently low
hi + ei + d Otherwise
(D.1)
If the updating rule is conservative, then as few hypotheses as possible should be
assigned a posterior probability of 0. It remains to show that this uniquely happens
when d is minimal. Suppose there are n hypotheses. Without loss of generality,
suppose the hypotheses are ordered such that 0 ≥ pE(H1) ≥ pE(H2) ≥ . . . ≥ pE(Hn).
Then there is some index m such that pE(Hi) = 0 for i ≤ m and pE(Hi) > 0 for
i > m. Note that the updating procedure is conservative if and only if m is minimal
because m is minimal if and only if a minimal number of hypotheses have a posterior
probability of 0. In order for the posterior probabilities to be probabilistic, we must
have: ∑
i
pE(Hi) =
∑
i>m
(hi + ei) + (n−m)d = 1 (D.2)
Now suppose we have a different updating rule resulting in some posterior p′ that
is not conservative: i.e. there an index m′ > m such that p
′
E(Hi) = 0 for i ≤ m
′
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and p
′
E(Hi) > 0 for i > m
′. Then p′ must satisfy the following constraint for some
normalization constant d′: ∑
i>m′
(hi + ei) + (n−m
′)d′ = 1 (D.3)
Comparing D.2 and D.3 and remembering that m′ > m, we see that:
0 <
m′∑
i=m
(hi + ei) = (n−m
′)d′ − (n−m)d (D.4)
And hence,
d <
n−m′
n−m
d′ < d′ (D.5)
Hence, d < d′. What the above proof shows is that any conservative updating rule
has a smaller additive normalization constant than any non-conservative updating
rule. To finish the proof, we show that there is just one conservative updating rule.
Here we can use D.4 again. If both updating rules are conservative, then we have
m = m′, and hence – making the necessary amendments in D.4, we have:
0 =
m′∑
i=m
(hi + ei) = (n−m)d
′ − (n−m)d (D.6)
Hence it follows that d′ = d. But then the two updating rules are equivalent.
Hence, there is only one conservative updating rule, namely the one that uses a
minimal additive normalization constant. This is predictive updating.
E General Bayesian updating is a special case of
inferential updating
The goal in this section is to show that Bissiri et al.’s (2016) general Bayesian up-
dating is a special case of inferential updating. For some normalization constant k,
we have:
p(H|E1, E2) = k ∗ Ev[E1|H,E2]Ev[E2|H ]p(H) = k ∗ f(L(E1, H))f(L(E2, H))p(H)
(E.1)
But we also have:
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p(H|E1, E2) = k ∗ Ev[E1, E2|H ]p(H) = k ∗ f(L(E1, H) + L(E2, H))p(H) (E.2)
Comparing C.1 and C.2, we see that f obeys the following functional equation
for all x and y: f(x)f(y) = f(x + y). Let g(x) = log f(x). Then g(x + y) =
g(x)+ g(y), which is the well known Cauchy equation whose solution is g(x) = −cx,
for some positive constant c (Acze´l, 2006, p. 31) (since f , and therefore g, is strictly
decreasing). Consequently f(x) = e−cx, and hence p(H|E) = k ∗ e−c∗L(E,H)p(H),
which is Bissiri et al.’s (2016) general Bayesian updating rule.
F An alternative characterization of the combina-
tion step
In both everyday and scientific contexts, it’s common to think of evidence alge-
braically: multiple lines of evidence combine in order provide stronger evidence;
some evidence favors a hypothesis, while other evidence goes against it; a piece of
evidence here can cancel out a piece of evidence there; and some purported evidence
has no effect at all. In other words, evidential favoring has all the hallmarks of a
mathematical group. Now, suppose – as we have been doing up to now – that we use
real numbers to represent evidential scores. Then the set of all possible evidential
scores, G, together with the combination function plausibly form a mathematical
group. Indeed, they plausibly form an Archimedean group, because intuitively there
is no maximal evidential score. That is, if we use • to denote the combination func-
tion, i.e. e1 • e2 = c(e1, e2), then it is plausible that (G, •) satisfies the following
axioms:
1. Closure. For all possible evidential scores e1 and e2, e1 • e2 is also a possible
evidential score.
2. Associativity. For all possible evidential scores e1, e2 and e3, (e1 • e2) • e3 =
e1 • (e2 • e3).
3. Identity. There exists a possible evidential score i such that for all e, i • e =
e • i = e. I.e., there exists a real number that represents evidence that has no
effect (either favorable or unfavorable).
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4. Inverse. For each possible evidential score e, there exists a possible evidential
score e′ such that e•e′ = e′ •e = i. I.e. every evidential score could potentially
(in principle) be cancelled out by other countervailing evidence.14
5. Commutativity. For all possible evidential scores e1 and e2, e1 • e2 = e2 • e1.
I.e. the order in which the evidence is considered is irrelevant.
6. Archimedean property. For all possible evidential scores e1 and e2, there
exists an integer n such that e1 < e2 • e2 . . . • e2(ntimes).
Suppose, in addition, that the set of evidential scores is totally ordered: for all
evidential scores e1 and e2, either e1 > e2 or e1 ≤ e2.
15 Then we can use the following
important result from group theory (see (Kopytov and Medvedev, 1996, p. 33), for
a proof):
Ho¨lder’s theorem. Every Archimedean totally ordered group is order-
isomorphic to a subgroup of the additive group of real numbers with the
natural order.
The fact that (G, •) is order-isomorphic to a subgroup of the additive group of real
numbers with the natural order means there exists some subgroup, (S,+) of the real
numbers and a one-to-one function, g, from (G, •) to (S,+) that obeys the following
equation for all e1 and e2 in G: g(e1•e2) = g(e1)+g(e2). Since g is one-to-one, it has
an inverse, f . Hence, for all e1 and e2 in G, we can write: e1 • e2 = f(g(e1) + g(e2)).
In the main text, I showed that the normalization procedure must be either addi-
tive or multiplicative, given that the combination function is either multiplicative or
additive. But, arguably, it is not unreasonable to simply assume that the normaliza-
tion must be either multiplicative or additive. Indeed, all updating rules that have
been proposed in the literature have implicitly relied on a normalization procedure
that is either multiplicative or additive. In particular, the normalization procedure
implicit in both standard Bayesian updating and Jeffrey updating (Jeffrey, 1983) is
multiplicative, and the normalization procedure implicit in Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s
(2010) alternative to Jeffrey updating is additive.
Finally, it is reasonable to assume – as we did in the main text – that the nor-
malization procedure commutes with the combination function in the sense that, for
all a, b, and c, we have: N(a • N(b)) = N(N(a) • b) = N(a • b). We can now give
the following characterization of the combination function:
14A referee points out that this is a bit of an idealization, since a piece of evidence and a defeater
of that evidence will not typically cancel each other out precisely.
15A referee rightly points out that this assumption is also idealized.
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Alternative characterization of the combination function. Sup-
pose the combination function, c(x, y) satisfies the following requirements :
1. The set of all evidential scores, G, and the combination function
c(x, y) = x • y together form a totally ordered Archimedean group.
2. The combination function commutes with the normalization func-
tion N in the sense that, for all a, b, and c: N(a•N(b)) = N(N(a)•
b) = N(a • b).
Then c must have one of the following two forms :
1. If the normalization function is additive, then c(x, y) = x+ y.
2. If the normalization function is multiplicative, then c(x, y) = xy.
Proof. The fact that the combination function commutes with the normalization
function implies that, for every e with inverse e−1:
N(e • e−1) = N(N(e) • e−1) = N(f(g(N(e)) + g(e−1))) (F.1)
Therefore, for all e, N(f(g(N(e))+g(e−1))) = N(i), where i is the identity element
of the group. Since N is one-to-one, this means that f(g(N(e)) + g(e−1)) = k, for
some constant k that does not depend on e. Furthermore, since f is one-to-one, this in
turn implies that g(N(e))+g(e−1) = k′, for some constant k′ that does not depend on
e. For the same reason, (F.1) also implies that g(e)+ g(e−1) = k′′, for some constant
k′′ that does not depend on e. Hence we have, finally, that g(N(e)) − g(e) = K,
where K = k′ − k′′. Hence, g(N(e)) = g(e) +K.
If the normalization procedure is multiplicative, then for some normalization
constant a, we have g(ae) = g(e) + K. Note that a depends on the set to which e
belongs. If {ei} is the set, then
a =
1∑
ei
(F.2)
Hence, depending on the other members of the set to which e belongs, a can be
any number in the half-open interval (0, 1
e
). Thus we have, for all e and all a in (0, 1
e
),
that g(ae) = g(e) +K, where K is a constant that may depend on a, but does not
depend on e.
Similarly, we have—for some normalization constant b—that g(bae) = g(ae) +
K ′ = g(e) +K ′′. Here, b can be any number in the range (0, 1
ae
), or in other words
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in (0,∞). But if we let y = ab and x = e, then the preceding means that for all x
and y in (0,∞) we have:
g(yx) = g(x) +K ′′ (F.3)
Where K ′′ depends on y, but not on x. Interchanging the role of y and x, we also
have:
g(xy) = g(y) +K ′′′ (F.4)
Where K ′′′ depends on x, but not on y. Comparing the above equations, we see
that g(x) +K ′′ = g(y) +K ′′′. This implies the following:
g(xy) = g(x) + g(y) + C (F.5)
Where C is a constant that depends on neither x nor y. Now note that f(2g(i)) =
i•i = i = f(g(i). Since f is one-to-one, this implies that g(i) = 0. Next, (F.5) implies
that g(i) = g(1 ∗ i) = g(1) + g(i) +C. Thus g(1) = −C. Using (F.5) again, we have
g(1) = g(i ∗ 1
i
) = g(i) + g(1
i
) = g(1
i
). But since g is one-to-one, this implies that
1
i
= 1, so that i = 1. Hence −C = g(1) = g(i) = 0, so C = 0. Finally, then, we have,
for all x > 0 and y > 0:
g(xy) = g(x) + g(y) (F.6)
Now put r(x) = g(ex). Then (F.6) becomes, for all real x and y:
r(x+ y) = r(x) + r(y) (F.7)
This is the Cauchy functional equation, whose only solution is r(x) = cx, for an
arbitrary constant c (Acze´l, 2006, p. 31). Hence, g(x) = r(log x) = log xc. Since f is
the inverse of g, we have that f(x) = ex
1
c . Finally, then, we have:
x • y = f(g(x) + g(y)) = e(log(x
c)+log(yc))
1
c = e(c∗log(xy))
1
c = xy (F.8)
I.e. the combination function is multiplicative, c(x, y) = xy.
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